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AMERICAN ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED TO 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION V. INTEL 
Paul Jones*1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2009, the European Commission found that the Intel 
Corporation (“Intel”) had abused its dominant position in the market for 
central processing units by unlawfully excluding competitors from the 
marketplace.2 As a result of the Commission’s findings, Intel was fined 
1.06 billion Euros;3 equivalent to 1.45 billion U.S. dollars, the largest 
fine ever levied by the Commission for breach of the European Union’s 
competition laws.4 The Commission’s decision was based on Article 82 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“Article 82”), 
which holds that a firm may not abuse its dominant position in a way that 
affects trade among its member states.5 
Jurisprudence regarding this type of dominant firm behavior reflects 
an economic and legal dilemma faced by governments around the world 
concerning the regulation of large firms in the marketplace.6 The 
dilemma exists because antitrust law is charged with reigning in 
unchallenged economic powers, which deaden competition and harm 
consumers, while allowing successful firms to enjoy victory in fair 
competition.7 Governments develop antitrust jurisprudence in order to 
regulate the market amidst this dilemma. A worldwide firm, such as 
Intel, operates among many governments, all of which have developed 
separate antitrust jurisprudence reflecting different standards and values 
in the regulation of markets. Analyzing the European Commission’s 
recent investigation and findings of Intel’s business practices under 
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2 Commission Provisional Decision COMP/C-3/37.990 – Intel, 2009, 274–76 [hereinafter 
Provisional Decision]. 
3 Id. at 511. 
4 James Kanter, Europe Fines Intel $1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/business/global/14compete.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
5 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, art. 82 
[hereinafter EC Treaty] (Article 82 has recently been renamed to Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.). 
6 ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND 
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY, 678 (West Group 2002). 
7 Id. 
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American jurisprudence provides a useful comparison between European 
and American antitrust law.  
The scope of this paper is to identify the conduct for which Intel was 
found in violation of the European Union’s competition laws and analyze 
the exact same conduct under the competition and antitrust laws of the 
United States. Section II is an introduction to the global market in which 
Intel competes. Section III discusses the European Commission’s case 
against Intel, including a pointed description of Intel’s unlawful conduct. 
Section IV provides an analysis of Intel’s European business practice, as 
described by the European Commission, analyzed under United States 
competition and antitrust jurisprudence. The last section discusses the 
standard that would likely be applied to Intel in a similar case heard in 
the United States.  
II. THE WORLD-WIDE CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT MARKET  
The central processing unit (“CPU”), also known as microprocessor 
or processor, is considered the brains of a computer. The CPU loads the 
operating system and basically all computer operations run through the 
CPU.8 CPU producers generally sell CPUs to Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) such as Dell, Hewlett Packard and Lenovo, 
which assemble computers using CPUs along with myriad hardware and 
software components purchased from many different producers.9 After 
assembly, the OEMs sell finished computers to both consumers and 
retailers.10  
The global market for producing and selling CPUs is dominated by 
Intel. Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) is the only other firm 
considered to be a major player in the industry. Nonetheless, Intel 
maintains nearly an 80% market share,11 while the two companies 
compete for the sale of practically every CPU throughout the world.12 
Over time, AMD has filed numerous antitrust complaints against Intel, 
which has spurred regulators in a number of countries to take a hard look 
                                                           
8 Encyclopedia Britannica, Central Processing Unit Definition, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102611/central-processing-unit (last visited Feb. 12, 
2011). 
9 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing, 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs010.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
10 Merriam Webster, OEM Definition, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oem (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
11 IDC – Press Release, Worldwide PC Microprocessor Unit Shipments Rise 31.3% Year Over 
Year in the Fourth Quarter, According to IDC, 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS22178710 (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
12 In 2009, Intel captured 79.7% of the microprocessor market while AMD had a market share 
of 20.1%; VIA Technologies had a negligible share of the market. See id. 
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at the way Intel competes for business.13 AMD has long felt that Intel has 
used its dominant position in the processor market to exert 
anticompetitive pressure on OEMs, placing artificial limits on AMD’s 
capacity to compete for CPU sales. AMD’s allegations are not without 
merit, as seen by the European Commission’s investigation of Intel, 
which centered on Intel’s business practices in the market for CPUs that 
were part of the “x86 family” of microprocessors.14 Today, most 
desktops, notebooks, and servers throughout the world utilize the x86 
family of processors. 
III. EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S FINDINGS: INTEL’S ABUSE OF A 
DOMINANT POSITION 
The European Commission’s three-year investigation of Intel’s 
potentially anticompetitive business practices found that Intel had 
engaged in two different types of anticompetitive behavior that violated 
the European Union’s competition laws: (1) conditional rebates and (2) 
naked restraints, or pay-for-delay agreements. The anticompetitive 
conduct stems from Intel’s business dealings with a number of OEMs—
Dell, Hewlett Packard, NEC, and Lenovo—as well as two European 
electronics and computer retailers—Media Markt and Saturn. Media 
Markt and Saturn are both owned and operated by a single parent 
company, Media Saturn Holding (“MSH”).15 The following details the 
Commission’s findings: 
A. Conditional Rebates and Payments 
According to the Commission’s findings, Intel’s business model 
included the practice of offering OEMs rebates on the condition that the 
OEMs agreed to buy all or nearly all of their x86 CPUs from Intel.16 Intel 
made payments to MSH, the European computer retailer, conditioned on 
the retailer exclusively selling computers that utilized the Intel x86 
CPU.17 These exclusivity agreements, known as conditional rebates, 
reduced the OEM’s freedom to choose from whom to purchase their x86 
CPUs and harmed end-user consumers by limiting their choice of the 
brand of CPUs integrated in the computers in the marketplace. The 
ultimate effect of the rebates was that they strong-armed OEMs, forced 
                                                           
13 Intel News Release, AMD and Intel Announce Settlement of All Antitrust and IP Disputes, 
http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/2009/20091112corp_a.htm (Nov. 12, 2009) (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
14 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 279. 
15 Id. at 53. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 279. 
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loyalty to Intel, and distorted competition in the marketplace for x86 
CPUs, resulting in the CPU market being affected by factors inconsistent 
with fair competition. 
The Commission conducted a thorough investigation of Intel’s 
business relationships with the major OEMs, as well as the European 
retailer, MSH. The findings revealed that Intel offered conditional 
rebates and payments that severely limited the amount of business the 
OEMs could conduct with non-Intel CPU producers, specifically AMD.18 
1) Dell  
The Commission found that Dell was exclusively incorporating Intel 
processors into its computers specifically in order to qualify for Intel’s 
conditional rebates.19 At one point, Dell evaluated the possibility of 
adding a line of AMD-based computers,20 but concluded that entering 
into an agreement with AMD would have an overall negative financial 
impact because Intel would discontinue or reduce the amount of rebates 
it offered.21 Intel never informed Dell of the exact amount by which the 
rebate would be reduced22; that uncertainness likely posed too great a 
risk for Dell to add the AMD-based line. With no written agreement 
regarding the rebate, Dell was apprehensive about dual sourcing with 
AMD. Thus, the rebate became a source of control for Intel and ensured 
that Dell would not stray from its exclusivity agreement.  
2) Hewlett Packard 
Much like Dell, Hewlett Packard (“HP”) was required to purchase a 
significant percentage of their supply of processors from Intel in order to 
qualify for a rebate. Although HP was not required to purchase 
exclusively from Intel, it was nonetheless required to purchase 95% of its 
processors from Intel to qualify for the rebate.23 HP was the first major 
OEM to offer an AMD-based business desktop, and it had plans to 
produce and ship a large volume of them. Ultimately however, it shipped 
only a limited number; the AMD-based units ended up accounting for 
less than five percent of HP’s x86 product offering. HP confirmed that 
Intel’s rebate was a major factor in its decision to scale down its AMD-
based desktop computer plans.  
                                                           
18 Kanter, supra note 4. 
19 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 280. 
20 Id. at 280–81. 
21 Id. at 281. 
22 Id. at 284. 
23 Id. at 287. 
WINTER 2010  INTEL 
56 
Worth mentioning is the fact that AMD was so interested in placing 
its processors in HP’s computers that it offered HP one million free 
processors.24 It is reasonable to assume that a company, unrestrained by 
anticompetitive forces, would gladly and quickly accept such an offer; 
however, HP only accepted a small fraction of the free processors.25 The 
decision to accept only a fraction of the CPUs, an essential and 
expensive element in HP’s product, makes little sense in a competitive, 
free market. Intel’s rebates undoubtedly influenced HP’s decision.  
3) NEC 
NEC’s rebate, much like Dell’s and HP’s, was conditional on NEC 
purchasing at least 80% of its x86 processors from Intel.26 
4) Lenovo 
Lenovo planned to roll out an AMD-based notebook in 2007, but 
canceled it before the project got off the ground. According to an email 
circulated within the company, Lenovo “cut a lucrative deal with Intel” 
and thus would “not be introducing AMD based products in 2007.”27 
Lenovo then became an exclusive buyer of Intel CPUs and dropped its 
plans with AMD.28   
This result is particularly interesting when viewed in light of 
Lenovo’s perception of AMD. Correspondences between Lenovo 
executives show that Lenovo was very interested in implementing AMD 
CPUs into its systems. The executives asserted that “AMD has the 
highest penetration in the market Lenovo is targeting for growth” and 
“AMD CPU prices are significantly below Intel.”29 Lenovo’s 
cancellation of its plans regarding AMD-based notebooks strongly 
suggests that the agreement Lenovo entered into with Intel was, in effect, 
a conditional rebate. Otherwise, Lenovo would have likely rolled out an 
AMD-based notebook in light of the fact that Lenovo’s executives were 
aware that AMD’s CPUs were less expensive than Intel and that there 
was a market demand for AMD-based notebooks. 
5) Media Saturn Holding  
                                                           
24 Id. at 288–89. 
25 Id. HP accepted only 160,000 processors. Id. 
26 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 293. 
27 Id. at 161–62 (quoting Lenovo submission pursuant to EU investigation). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 296 (quoting Lenovo submission pursuant to EU investigation) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Media Saturn Holding ("MSH") is a German-based consumer 
electronics retailer which operates in fourteen European countries.30 
MSH is the largest personal computer retailer in Europe.31 Intel 
contracted with MSH to offer certain rebate payments in exchange for 
MSH's promise to exclusively offer Intel-based computer systems.32 The 
two companies continued a conditional rebate relationship in various 
forms for nearly ten years prior to the Commission’s investigation.33  
MSH actually viewed certain AMD-based products to be attractive 
substitutes for similar Intel products and was seriously interested in 
selling AMD-based computer systems. On a number of occasions, MSH 
entered into negotiations with AMD regarding the viability of carrying 
AMD products. The negotiations never materialized because the 
conditional rebate payments offered by Intel were always more 
lucrative.34  Thus, the result was the same as with the OEMs—Intel’s 
conditional rebates restricted MSH’s freedom to choose between CPU 
manufactures and limited what it could offer its customers. 
As evidenced by its agreements with Dell, HP, NEC, Lenovo, and 
MSH, Intel offered substantial economic benefits in exchange for 
promises of fidelity. The OEMs became captive and were strapped with 
golden handcuffs once they accepted the rebates. The exclusivity 
agreements forced the OEMs to forego business opportunities and 
ventures they would have otherwise pursued. 
B. European Jurisprudence of Conditional Rebates 
Markets that are dominated by a single firm are subject to the 
regulations found in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. Article 82 prohibits firms with a dominant position from 
abusing their position in a way that negatively impacts competition.35 
Article 82 is enforced by the European Commission,36 which has held 
that Article 82 is a tool to objectively analyze whether the dominant firm 
has engaged in “methods different from those which condition normal 
competition in products and services,” and result in a weakening of 
competition or stifling the growth of competition in the market.37 The 
                                                           
30 Id. at 176. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 298. 
33 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 176. 
34 Id. at 293. 
35 See EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 82. 
36 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 13. 
37 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. ¶ 91; accord Case C-95/04, British 
Airways v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 66. 
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European Union’s Court of Justice, the highest court in the Union, has 
also consistently held that a dominant firm illegally abuses its position, 
per Article 82, if it obligates a purchaser to acquire all or most of their 
requirement exclusively from the dominant firm, even when the 
obligation “is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a rebate” or 
within “a system of fidelity rebates.”38 Conditional rebates are 
“incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the 
common market.”39  
The Court's inquiry is focused on the conduct of the dominant firm in 
the industry and the exclusionary intent of the agreements.40 The analysis 
does not consider the effect of the agreement on other market 
participants.41 Thus, a dominant firm can be found to have abused its 
position regardless of whether its competitors suffered or were likely to 
have suffered foreclosure or other adverse effects. Furthermore, under 
Article 82, it does not matter if the other competitors in the market 
experienced setbacks or, even in the unlikely scenario, greater success 
during the time the conditional rebates were in place.42 
C. Pay-for-Delay, Naked Restraints  
On a more limited scale, Intel was found to have violated Article 82 
by engaging in naked restraints; requiring OEMs through contractual 
provisions to delay the release of certain AMD products (“pay-for-
delay”).43 Even though Intel engaged in pay-for-delay agreements on a 
more limited scale than the conditional rebates, the pay-for-delay 
agreements are perhaps more egregious because, unlike conditional 
rebates, which could arguably lead to efficiency enhancements such as 
more dedicated support and service for Intel products by the OEM or 
retailer, pay-for-delay agreements lack any redeeming efficiency or pro-
competitive justification.44 The only outcome of pay-for-delay 
agreements is that the supplier, Intel in this case, is benefited by the time 
the competing products are not offered in the marketplace. When the 
supplier is a dominant firm, like Intel, their dominance is further 
entrenched. End users are ultimately harmed because there is less 
competition and these effects usually last much longer than the agreed 
upon delay period.  
                                                           
38 Hoffman-La Roche, Case 85/76, ¶ 89. 
39 Id. at ¶ 90. 
40 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 277–78. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 472 
44 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: 
Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/jorde2.shtm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
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1) Hewlett Packard 
The agreement between Intel and HP included terms whereby HP 
had to limit and postpone its distribution of AMD-based business 
desktops.45 Specifically, the agreement restricted HP from selling AMD-
based desktops to mainstream business customers, and AMD products 
could only be purchased directly from HP rather than from HP’s 
downstream business partners.46  Furthermore, HP had to agree to delay 
the launch of the AMD computers in certain large markets for six 
months.47  Naturally, these limits were injurious to AMD because its 
market reach via HP was delayed and relegated to nonmainstream 
business. By extension, the limits were injurious to end-user consumers 
because consumers in mainstream business were unable to purchase 
AMD-based HP computers. In effect, Intel had completely blocked that 
distribution channel.  
2) Acer 
Acer had planned to launch both an AMD desktop and notebook in 
September 2003. It delayed the launch until January 2004 in some 
markets and May 2004 in others.48 Acer’s decision to delay the launch 
was induced by pressure from Intel executives, which prompted Acer to 
feel that Intel funding would be decreased if it did not delay the launch as 
Intel desired.49 
3) Lenovo 
Lenovo entered into an agreement with AMD to launch two 
notebooks in 2006; the first wave of geographic markets in June and the 
other markets in September or October.50 Negotiations regarding funding 
from Intel induced Lenovo to postpone the first wave to coincide with 
the second wave to take place in September or October.51 Then the 
launch was postponed until 2007.52 Ultimately, due to financial pressure 
Intel exerted upon Lenovo, the launch was canceled entirely.53  
                                                           
45 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 474–76. 
46 Id. at 474-75. 
47 Id. at 475. 
48 Id. at 477. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 477-78. 
51 Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 478. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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D. European Jurisprudence of Pay-for-Delay, Naked Restraints 
Article 82 is upheld as an objective, results-oriented standard 
applicable to the full spectrum of anticompetitive conduct by a dominant 
firm. European Commission case law constructs an analysis void of 
inspection of the smaller firm’s performance during the agreement 
period.54 Proper analysis of Intel’s conduct leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the pay-for-delay agreements caused delays and 
restrictions on the commercialization of AMD-based products, which in 
turn had a negative effect on competition among member states in 
violation of Article 82.   
IV. INTEL’S CONDUCT ANALYZED UNDER AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE  
Intel’s conduct in Europe may be unique to its operations in the 
European Union, or it may provide a window into the type of general 
business practices Intel is engaged in around the globe. If Intel had made 
the same arrangements with OEMs and retailers in the United States, its 
actions would be evaluated according to American antitrust 
jurisprudence.   
A. United States Antitrust Standards 
In the United States, unilateral conduct by dominant firms is 
regulated by Section Two of the Sherman Act (“§2”).55  Under §2, firms 
are forbidden from taking steps to create or maintain a monopoly.56 The 
language of the Sherman Act is often much stricter than its application, 
as case law has fleshed out the unacceptable unilateral conduct that tends 
to create or maintain a monopoly. Section 2 is composed of three 
different offenses by which a defendant can be brought in violation: 
monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and conspiring to monopolize 
(conspiring is seldom alleged). The Clayton Act, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, and the Robison-Putnam Act also play a role in which 
competition among firms is regulated in the United States.  
1) Monopolization 
To violate the monopolization standard of §2, the defendant must 
have monopoly power in the relevant market and must have acquired or 
maintained that power anti-competitively, as distinguished from natural 
                                                           
54 Id. at 479. 
55 15 U.S.C. §2 (2010). 
56 Id. 
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growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.57 Thus, not all monopolies are unlawful. 
The first step in a monopolization case is to determine if the defendant 
has monopoly power. Market share is an often-used method to determine 
market power; however, the question of how much market share is 
needed to make an inference of monopoly power is still unclear. Case 
law has established that a 90% share of the market is enough, while 41% 
is not.58 Judge Learned Hand offered further guidance by saying that “it 
is doubtful whether sixty . . . percent would be enough” to establish 
monopoly power.59  
A recent development in determining monopoly power is the 
implementation of the cross elasticity of demand test, which courts have 
begun to use to determine the relevant market and market power.60 Cross 
elasticity of demand is an economic tool for measuring consumer 
response when a firm raises prices. If consumers can easily substitute 
another product in response to the raised price, then the product market 
will need to be expanded to include the product that consumers 
purchased after the price increase.61 Since the relevant market was 
expanded to include the second product, the first producer will have a 
high cross elasticity of demand; market share will decrease and with it 
the likelihood of a finding of monopoly power. Inversely, if a producer is 
able to raise prices and consumers are unable to find close substitutes in 
response to the price increase, there is low elasticity and the market can 
be narrowly defined. Thus, if the producer is a dominant player in the 
market, there is an increased chance it will be found to have monopoly 
power. 
Once monopoly power is established, the second prong of illegal 
monopolization needs to be proven: acquisition or maintenance of the 
                                                           
57 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). This framework is still in 
effect today, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
58 Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and Aluminum Company of America had 90% share of the 
market and were deemed to have monopoly power. U.S. Steel’s 41% was insufficient to determine 
monopoly power as was Standard Oil of Indiana’s 26%. 
59 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
60 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The Court defined the 
appropriate market for flexible wrapping materials as compared to a market for the Du Pont-made 
cellophane. Definition of the market is critical to any monopoly analysis and is often the crux of the 
monopoly power issue. Since the relevant market was defined broadly, du Pont was found to have 
relatively less market share and no monopoly power. Id. Other econometric measurement may not 
literally decrease market share and yet reveal that the company’s hold on market share is not as 
strong as it appears and questions monopoly power even in light of a high percentage of market 
share. GAVIL, supra note 6. 
61 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND 
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2004). 
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monopoly via improper, anticompetitive, exclusionary conduct.62 
Examples of improper conduct include artificial and anticompetitive 
barriers to entry, certain types of systematic price discrimination, tying 
arrangements, market leveraging, predatory pricing, price squeezing as 
wholesaler and retailer, refusal to deal, and other exclusionary and 
anticompetitive conduct.63 
2) Attempt To Monopolize 
To satisfy an attempt to monopolize claim, the defendant must have 
“(1) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct, with (2) a specific 
intent to monopolize, and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power.”64 The type of anticompetitive conduct in attempt to 
monopolize claims largely mirrors the type of conduct prohibited by 
monopolization claims. Intent is a major factor because the harm that the 
monopolization claim protects against has not occurred yet; but if intent 
is present it allows the government and private litigants an avenue of 
relief while the potentially monopolistic behavior is in its incipiency. 
Requiring proof of the probability of achieving monopoly power is 
essential to the attempt claim.  If exclusionary conduct, even 
accompanied by malicious intent, is not likely to lead to monopoly 
power, consumers are not at risk of suffering from the type of control 
monopolists are able to exert, and consequently, no violation exists.65 
B. American Antitrust Standards Applied to Intel’s Conduct 
If Intel had entered into conditional rebates and pay-for-delay naked 
restraints in the United States, it could be sued by a competitor such as 
AMD or one of the United States government agencies charged with 
enforcing American antitrust and competition laws—the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Competition or the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice. Regardless of who brings the suit, the case would 
be tried on the foundation of United State statutes, namely Section Two 
of the Sherman Act and the cases that have established American 
competition and antitrust jurisprudence. The remainder of this section 
will analyze Intel’s conduct of entering into conditional rebates and pay-
for-delay agreements under the framework of American antitrust 
jurisprudence. 
1) Conditional Rebates 
                                                           
62 GAVIL, supra note 6, at 593. 
63 SULLIVAN, supra note 61, at 649–706. 
64 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
65 Id.; see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993). 
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If Intel had entered into conditional rebate arrangements with OEMs 
in the United States, similar to its arrangements with the OEMs in 
Europe, a finding of anticompetitive conduct would not be as certain 
under United States antitrust laws as it was with the European 
Commission’s decision. Even though the conduct of offering rebates on 
the basis of exclusivity appear to create or maintain a monopoly on its 
face, United States case law has established that only a subset of 
exclusionary rebates are anticompetitive.  
A rebate similar to that of Intel’s was at issue in Brooke Group Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson, where the United States Supreme Court held 
that under the Robinson-Putnam Act, which makes certain price 
discrimination practices unlawful, the injury is of the same general 
character as that “inflicted by predatory pricing schemes actionable 
under §2.”66 In other words, because the rebates actually decrease the 
price paid for the product(s), the offering of conditional rebates is 
analyzed under the framework of predatory pricing, which focuses on the 
price charged for the product in relation to the cost to produce that same 
product.67 While lowering prices can be a way firms compete, it can also 
be a means of anticompetitive predation. The Supreme Court has 
cautioned: “The costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high. [T]he 
mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering 
prices—is often the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates 
competition; because cutting prices in order to increase business often is 
the very essence of competition” and that “mistaken inferences . . . are 
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws 
are designed to protect.”68          
Brooke Group established a two-pronged test for determining when a 
company has “priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to 
eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control 
over prices in the relevant market.”69 The first prong, known as the 
below cost requirement, requires the plaintiff to prove that its rival has 
set its prices “below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.”70 The 
second prong, the recoupment cost, is a determination as to whether the 
rival has a “dangerous probability[] of recouping its investment in below 
cost pricing.”71  
                                                           
66 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 226 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 122 n.17 (1986) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
69 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 224 
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The first prong tends to show the predatory nature of the conduct. 
Firms that compete on the merits are not able to consistently price their 
products below the costs they incur to produce the products; otherwise, 
they would not be able remain a going concern. Predators, firms who 
price below cost, are altering the playing field such that other firms 
cannot be expected to compete and will eventually be forced out of the 
market. This results in the predator having increased market share and 
possibly gaining monopoly power. Predatory firms view the first phase 
of a predatory pricing scheme as an investment because it will likely lose 
money during the predatory pricing campaign by selling below cost, but 
after competing firms exit the market, the predator enters the second 
phase of the predatory pricing scheme.  In the second phase, the firm 
charges monopoly, or supra-competitive, prices for the product in a 
market where it has gained greater market share and control. Consumers 
are harmed because of the price increases, and the predator can replay 
the strategy if it is threatened by a market entrant, further entrenching 
itself as a monopolist to the detriment of the consuming society. 
It is important to emphasize that a low price alone is not enough to 
trigger antitrust liability. Low prices may be the result of a predatory 
pricing scheme, but they may also result from a number of efficiency 
based reasons, such as innovation, streamlined distribution, or improved 
contracts with suppliers. When low prices result from better run 
businesses, consumers benefit and the firm should not be subject to 
antitrust liability. 
The second prong from Brooke Group, which is much more difficult 
to establish than the first, is intended to force the plaintiff to prove 
antitrust injury72 and show that not only was it harmed, but the 
consuming public was harmed or at risk of being harmed by the rival’s 
pricing scheme. Naturally, if a plaintiff is only able to establish below 
cost pricing and nothing more, the consumers are benefited because 
prices have been decreased and consumers are not in danger of being 
subject to supra-competitive prices; hence, there is no reason to 
reprimand or punish the rival. However, if a plaintiff can establish that a 
rival is capable of charging monopoly prices, after it and other 
competitors are forced out of the market because of the below cost 
pricing of a rival, then the courts take issue with the conduct as the 
practice will likely harm consumers in the long run.   
Brooke Group involved the oligopolistic cigarette market which was 
not dominated by a single-firm monopolist.73 Although there were just a 
                                                           
72 Antitrust injury is generally required of all antitrust plaintiffs. A plaintiff needs to establish 
that they have sustained an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent or remedy. 
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Matic, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
73 There were six major cigarette manufacturers in the industry. 
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few firms in the industry, it was still a very competitive market; the 
defendant in Brooke Group had only a 12% market share.74 This is in 
stark contrast to the near 80% market share Intel enjoyed in the CPU 
market. While Brooke Group was decided by the United States Supreme 
Court and has become the standard for conditional rebate cases, the Intel 
and AMD relationship more closely parallels a Third Circuit decision—
Le Page’s v. 3M, which involved a monopolistic market. 
In Le Page’s, the producer of Scotch brand tape, 3M, held a 90% 
share of the transparent tape market.75 LePage’s, a competitor, filed suit 
against 3M under §2 monopolization and attempted monopolization 
claims.76 LePage’s charged 3M with bundling rebates and entering into 
exclusivity contracts, and the Third Circuit explicitly denied 3M’s 
Brooke Group defense.77 3M admitted that it was a monopolist and that it 
entered into exclusivity agreements, but argued that it did not violate the 
law because it “never priced its transparent tape below its cost,” 
apparently in complete reliance on Brooke Group.78 Based largely on 
market structure, the Third Circuit held that “a monopolist is not free to 
take certain actions that a company in a competitive (or even 
oligopolistic) market may take, because there is no market constraint on 
a monopolist’s behavior.”79 The parenthetical appears to be a direct 
response to 3M’s Brooke Group defense because Brooke Group 
concerned the oligopolistic cigarette market, and 3M was a monopolist in 
a market for transparent tape.  
3M based its defense on the first prong of the Brooke Group test—
below cost pricing. The court, however, discounted the first prong for 
application in the monopolistic market and focused on the second 
prong—recoupment of losses after the period of discount pricing.80 3M 
conceded that it could recoup the lost profits it incurred during the time it 
instituted its pricing strategy81 apparently under the belief that it was 
safeguarded by the below-cost pricing element of Brooke Group. 
However, because competition in an oligopoly makes it more difficult to 
recoup discounted pricing, the below cost requirement is a sufficient 
standard for courts to establish the predatory, exclusionary requirement 
of §2 in oligopolies. In a monopoly, however, it is easier to recoup the 
                                                           
74 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2003). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 141–47. 
79 Id. at 151–52. 
80 Id. 
81 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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investment in discounted pricing—if the monopolist successfully 
eliminates competition by using a discount-pricing strategy, it can then 
increase prices by the use of its monopoly power. To prevent this type of 
harm, the first prong of Brooke Group is appropriately lowered in 
monopoly markets, as was the case in LePage’s.  
To summarize, the lower LePage’s standard holds that a monopolist 
violates §2 when it competes on any basis other than the merits, 
regardless of above–or below–cost pricing. Because a monopolist can 
easily charge supra-competitive prices and recoup lost profits from its 
discount-pricing scheme by raising prices once competitors are forced 
out of business, the hurdle of anticompetitive, exclusionary conduct is 
rightfully lowered. However, when dealing with an oligopoly, like in 
Brooke Group, the higher hurdle may be necessary.  
The result is that Brooke Group is very friendly to defendants 
because it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the defendant 
is able to recoup its investment in below cost pricing.82 As such, Intel 
would be in a better position to defend its conduct under the Brooke 
Group standard than the LePage’s standard. If Brooke Group were 
applied, the plaintiff would need to establish that Intel sold its processors 
at a price that was less than the cost to produce them, after taking into 
consideration the value of the rebates Intel offered to its OEM customers. 
Unfortunately, the European Commission’s case does not provide 
enough facts to establish that Intel met the first prong of Brooke Group 
because below-cost-pricing is not a factor under Article 82.  If Intel can 
show that it sold the CPUs for a price that was at all higher than its costs 
to produce them, it will prevail in an antitrust suit if Brooke Group is the 
standard. If the first prong of Brooke Group is satisfied and Intel is 
shown to have sold its CPUs for prices lower than its cost to produce 
them, the analysis would proceed to the second prong.  
Proving the second prong—showing that the predator is able to 
recoup its investment in below-cost pricing—is often where plaintiffs 
struggle to prove their case. With the case of Intel however, proving the 
second prong would be rather straightforward. If AMD, the only real 
threat to Intel’s chokehold on the CPU global market, were to exit the 
industry, Intel would not only have monopoly power, but it would 
practically be the only participant in the market. Intel would be free to 
raise prices for their CPUs because there would be no other viable 
                                                           
82 Some schools of thought hold that it is extremely rare, almost to the point of impossible, to 
profitably engage in predatory pricing because recoupment is or nearly is impossible – there would 
need to be a market with insurmountable barriers to entry to make recoupment profitable. SULLIVAN, 
supra note 61. The court in Matsushita claimed that the cartel would need to charge supra-
competitive prices for 30 years in order to recoup their supposed investment in predatory pricing and 
the barriers to entry in the television market were not so great as to keep competitors from entering 
the market amid monopoly pricing. 
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options for OEMs. Any competitor vying for a position in the market 
would have to overcome significant barriers to entry,83 and Intel would 
have a considerable amount of time as the sole producer of CPUs to 
further entrench its monopoly.  
It may be the case that because the probability of recoupment for 
Intel is so great, that the court would choose to apply LePage’s standard 
over Brooke Group, even though La Page’s is a Third Circuit decision. 
The make-up of the CPU market is similar to the transparent tape market 
in LePage’s in the sense that both markets are dominated by a 
monopolist. If the LePage’s standard was applied to Intel, it is almost 
certain that Intel would be found to have violated United States antitrust 
law. Recall that under LePage’s, the monopolist would be liable if it 
competed on any basis other than on the merits, regardless of above-or 
below-cost pricing. A court would likely find that Intel’s conditional 
rebate agreements were a form of competition not based on the merits. 
Furthermore, under the LePage’s standard, there is no need to address 
recoupment because in a monopoly, the monopolist inherently has 
sufficient market power to recoup an investment in discount pricing. 
2)   Pay-for-Delay, Naked Restraints  
Had Intel entered into naked restraints with OEMs, or in other words, 
paid to delay the release of computers using a rival’s CPU, the conduct 
would likely be deemed unlawful per se, and the firm employing the pay-
for-delay strategy would not be given an opportunity to justify the 
noncompetitive conduct. The relationship between Intel and the various 
OEMs could be categorized as supplier and retailer. OEMs are retailers 
because they readily sell to end-users even though they also distribute to 
retail centers after they manufacture the computers. Thus, their 
relationship is vertical.84 Intel supplies a major component to the OEMs, 
who then manufacture the computers and sell them to end users.  
Historically, vertical restrictions have been considered unlawful per 
se in the United States.85 Even though in Continental T.V. v. GTE 
Sylvania, the Supreme Court held that vertical restraints are no longer 
illegal per se, but should be decided based on the rule of reason,86 the 
                                                           
83 See Provisional Decision, supra note 2, at 38–39 (discussing barriers to entry). 
84 GAVIL, supra note 6, at 339. 
85 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (overruled by Leegin 
Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (Dr. Miles held that resale price 
maintenance is per se unlawful). 
86 388 U.S. 365. Under the rule of reason analysis “the fact finder weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing 
an unreasonable restraint on competition.” Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 48. 
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rule of reason standard was meant only to apply to vertical restraints that 
are justifiable by the creation of efficiencies. Vertical restraints, such as 
pay-for-delay agreements, are aimed at excluding a rival and devoid of 
an efficiency justification.87 A firm that employs such restrictions has 
“no purpose but to advantage its own product by impeding rivals.”88 
Thus, such conduct would likely be found illegal per se under the 
standard prior to Continental T.V. 
Furthermore, though little case law on point exists because this type 
of conduct is so extreme,89 in Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., the 
defendant, Conwood, engaged in removing and destroying the sales 
racks of a competing tobacco company in the retail stores wherein the 
two companies competed for sales.90 The court found the exclusionary 
conduct to be unlawful because it was “anticompetitive, lacked an 
efficiency justification, and entrenched the monopolist[‘]s position.”91 
An analogy can be drawn between the defendant’s conduct in Conwood 
and Intel contracting with OEMs to delay or not sell AMD-based 
computers. Similar to Conwood, there is no purpose behind Intel 
delaying the launch of AMD-based computers except to advantage its 
own product by impeding AMD and entrenching its monopolistic 
position.92  
Intel’s pay-for-delay agreements could also be held illegal under the 
LePage’s standard. The holding in LePage’s is broad and prohibits all of 
a monopoly’s competitive efforts made on a basis other than the merits.93 
Paying a retailer to postpone the launch of a competitor’s product would 
no doubt be considered competition on a basis other than on the merits.  
Another relevant case is Aluminum Company of America 
(“Alcoa”).94 Alcoa was a monopolist in the aluminum market, where it 
paid electric companies to refuse to offer power to competing aluminum 
producers.95 This was a true naked restraint because Alcoa paid money 
solely for the agreement to withhold power from its competitors, and 
nothing else. Alcoa paid to keep its competitor from producing 
aluminum; Intel paid to keep its competitors’ product from leaving the 
warehouse and entering the stream of commerce.  
                                                           
87 See Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and 
the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 463–64 (2006). 
88 Id. at 447. 
89 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 227–28 (1986). 
90 Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
91 Popofsky, supra note 87, at 447; see also Conwood, 290 F.2d at 768. 
92 See Popofsky, supra note 87, at 447. 
93 LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2003). 
94 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
95 Id. at 421–22. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 7 
 
69 
 
Intel, however, could argue that it has an efficiency justification for 
its conduct because it was actually in vertical relationships with each of 
the retailers that it entered into the pay-for-delay agreements with. If 
Intel can articulate an efficiency justification for contractually limiting its 
retailer to delay the launch of a competing product, it might take the 
restraint out of the naked restraint category. One efficiency justification 
could be that the retailer would be able to apply more time and resources 
toward selling and servicing Intel-based products. Although a stretch, 
such an argument might make the restraint appear ancillary to an 
otherwise efficiency-enhancing contract between a supplier and its 
retailer.96 In comparison to Alcoa, Intel is certainly closer to its contract 
partners than Alcoa was with most of the power companies with whom it 
contracted. Ultimately however, Intel would be hard pressed to articulate 
an efficiency justification that would be the natural consequence of any 
OEM delaying the launch of AMD products that would hold up in 
litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If Intel’s European business practices were on trial in the federal 
courts of the United States, the result would not be as certain as the 
European Commission’s finding of violation. The European Union’s sole 
standard for dominant firm behavior, Article 82, is a broad restriction 
against the allowable conduct of businesses that control the majority of 
the markets they compete in. Article 82 proscribes any conduct 
undertaken by a dominant firm that deviates from normal competition 
and results in stifling the growth of competition in the marketplace.97 
European case law has established that conditional rebates are simply 
incompatible with the objectives of undistorted competition.98  
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group 
opened the door for analysis concerning whether Intel’s rebate system 
would likely yield monopoly profits in the long run.99 Additionally, 
Brooke Group considered the ultimate effect on consumers; if rebates 
lower prices and are not likely to lead to supra-competitive pricing, 
consumers benefit from the lower prices.100 Brooke Group also held that 
                                                           
96 Ancillary restraints are viewed quite differently from naked restraints. See United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 175 U.S. 211, 239–40 (1999). 
97 EC Treaty, supra note 5, Art. 82. 
98 Case C-95/04, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 66. 
99 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) 
(describing recoupment test). 
100 Id. at 222–23. 
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there is nothing anticompetitive about a rebate system that results in 
above cost pricing.101 Punishing firms for reducing prices would likely 
chill competition, the very behavior the antitrust laws are instituted to 
protect.102 Under the Brooke Group framework, certain conduct would be 
permitted that would not be permitted under European antitrust 
jurisprudence. Whether Intel would be held liable under Brooke Group 
would depend on the outcome of the below-cost-pricing and recoupment 
tests.  
The Court might choose not to even apply the defendant-friendly 
Brooke Group standard and instead apply the more plaintiff-friendly 
LePage’s standard. LePage’s appears to fit Intel’s situation very well and 
establishes a different standard for how a monopolist is regulated in 
rebate situations. If the court applies the LePage’s standard, then Intel 
would most likely be found to have violated the antitrust laws concerning 
the conditional rebates because LePage sets a lower hurdle for plaintiffs 
to clear in order to show that rebate practices of a monopolist are 
anticompetitive and injurious to consumers. However, Le Page’s is a 
Third Circuit decision, and Brooke Group is a decision from the United 
States Supreme Court; even though Brook Group was based on the 
oligopolistic cigarette market, the decision did not explicitly limit itself 
to oligopolies. 
As for Intel’s naked exclusion, the pay-for-delay arrangements, the 
conduct is almost certainly to be ruled illegal per se in American courts, 
similar to the European Commission’s decision. Paying to delay the 
launch of a competitor’s product is extreme behavior and violates the 
principles of fair competition in both the Unites States and Europe.  
Studying Intel’s conduct under the construct of two countries’ 
antitrust laws is a thread in the large tapestry of comparative law. The 
countries satisfy their need to regulate commerce in very similar ways, 
but with obvious dissimilarities as well. A narrow look at Intel’s conduct 
reveals that the issue of conditional rebates is debatable under American 
jurisprudence, but it is the equivalent of a per se violation under 
European jurisprudence. The two countries are aligned in considering 
extremely anticompetitive conduct such as naked restraints as violative 
of competition laws. Analyzing Intel’s European business practices 
under American antitrust jurisprudence reveals that America and Europe 
have constructed their respective antitrust laws upon frameworks that 
serve slightly differing goals. 
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